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DISPATCH	SECRET	MARKED FOR INDEXING
0		X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
Chief of Base, Munich	Page Ponn	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
Curer or	Base, Bonn Station, Germany	CAN JUDGE INDEXING
ROM	7 188	MICROFILM
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CATIDE "GEIGE" Case		LICE
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES		,
Reference: L J, 29	April 1965	
<pre>l. The following is memorandum which was dist government:</pre>	a translation of the signific cribúted to various agencies a	ant portions of a [] and offices in the Danish
"On 25 April 19 Copenhagen:	965 the third secretary at the	Czech embassy in
	Josef LENSKY,	
ŀ	oorn 7 March 1920 in Loucany,	CSSR
The operation who controlled the apersons who were imprintelligence services. a. IENSKY was b. The meeting	om Danish soil and that he had a with an agent who was a West which was conducted together a agent enabled us to learn the plicated and about the activite in this country: the only person who handled gs were counter surveilled by the Czech embassy Frantisek!	with a friendly service following about the ties of the Czech the agent.
born 8 Apr counter-su c. The contac meetings a	e CSSR or by the third secret il 1926 in Dubnany. Some of rveilled by both these person t with the agent was maintained by communications transmit	the meetings were s. ed by personal
through ac	commodation addresses.	
Distribution: 2 - COB, Munich 1 - C/EE 2 - C/WE 1 - COB, Bonn 2 - COS, Germany		GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and geclassification
	E	<u> </u>
ROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	\mathcal{L} \mathcal{A}	7 May 1965
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	21-6-20/3

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH

SECRET

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d. At the first meeting safety signals and identification signals were used.

When a meeting was arranged an alternate time was always agreed upon.

The meetings took place on Saturdays with several month intervals. In one instance there was only a month between the meetings.

All the meetings took place in restaurants in Copenhagen, and the information and requirements were passed in the restaurant. LENSKY often passed the requirements to the agent hidden in a periodical andhhad trouble communicating with the agent since he spoke a very poor German.

h. Jaroslav KRAML, who counter-surveilled the last meeting, left the restaurant before the agent and the case officer and was therefore unable to take any action to prevent our service from arresting the two persons. The arrests took place immediately after the meeting was concluded. It is our impression that the counter-surveillance was conducted in a sloppy and indifferent manner.

i. When this service made the arrests it was determined that LENSKY was in possession of hand written notes from the agent as well as a list of requirements for the agent.

j. During the next-to-last meeting the agent received an oil can with a false bottom which contained a new code for the agent. The agent was instructed in the use of the concealment device in a public toilet.

On 26 April KRAML received a telephone call from the Soviet embassy. The following conversation took place after the Soviet official had stated that he would like to come by to get a visa for one of "ours":

"But Soviet citizens do not require visas to enter the CSSR."

"Oh really? I'll have to tell my consul this - just a moment."-"Can our consul come out to see you anyway?"

"Yes, he can."

"It is about a visa."

"Any time. When does he wish to come? Is it your consul who will come?"

"Yes, it is."

The above conversation seems to be of considerable interest in view of the fact that the Soviet consul, Ninel A. TARNOWSKY (born 17 August 1924 in Kharkov) is believed to be the local KGB resident.

It can further be stated that this case is a typical example of the Eastern modus operandi by which important agents in West Germany are handled by intelligence officers from the East who are stationed in other Western countries."

2. We shall forward the more detailed L _] report on thecease when it has been received from them.

53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION